Philosophy of Religion Essay

In this paper, I will evaluate the argument Richard Swinburne offered in support of theism. I will first explain the distinction between regularities of co-presence and regularities of succession and why their understanding is necessary in understanding Swinburne’s argument. After this, I will present the arguments I have derived from the passage given, derived from Swinburne’s book. I will then proceed to identify the issues that determine whether his is a sound theory or not by explaining the premises Swinburne bases his argument on, and conclude by giving reasons why I think these objections succeed. Richard Swinburne bases the argument he offers in support of theism on regularities of succession by first stating that prior attempts by philosophers and theologies of the eighteenth century to prove the existence of God failed because they largely based their arguments on regularities of co-presence. The distinction of these regularities, according to Swinburne, is that while regularities of co-presence are patterns of spatial order at a specific instant in time, regularities of succession are the simple patterns of behavior exhibited by objects because of the external influence by the forces of nature. For example, the orderliness of the various organs within the human body and how they perform in perfect synchrony to complement each other’s functionalities is a regularity of co-presence. Regularities of succession are based on empirically derivable laws of interaction. The action of attraction and repulsion that occurs within the sub-atomic particles within an atom, and how these forces end up determining the formation of matter by biding many atoms together is an example of a regularity of succession. Swinburne offers the natural balance of the universe brought about by the mutual attraction of planetary bodies with respect to the distance between them and their weights as an illustration of the action of regularities of succession. The following is an outline of Swinburne’s argument in favor of theism. All objects within the universe, living or dead, always behave strictly according to the laws of nature (1). This is not however sufficient enough to be the basis of concluding that theism is true. There is a need to establish the cause of regularities of succession. All regularities of succession exist due to the operation of scientific laws (2), but the most fundamental regularities cannot be given an empirical explanation, and since for the purpose of this argument they must be explained anyway, this explanation must be based in the rational choices of free agents. A dancer’s movements are determined by the rhythm of the tune he or she is dancing to, and this being a regularity of succession is proof that all regulations of succession must have an agent. Similarly, an agent must be responsible for the harmony exhibited by the universe as it behaves according to the laws of nature. The universe is so harmonious and it is very wide, the powers of the agent controlling it must be very immense compared to those of the dancer who, with the freedom of choice, moves in synchrony to the rhythm of a tune (3). The most fundamental of scientific regularities, which are regularities of succession, cause other regularities of succession, and even these most fundamental regularities must have a causative agent. There can be no better explanation to the most basic regularities of succession, so we conclude that an agent bestowed with power and intelligence just like men but at a much higher degree is most likely responsible for their action, thus the proof of theism. Swinburne attributes the existence of regularities of succession to an ultimate causative agent. In his argument, he draws a comparison between the rational choice of a free agent in the simpler term and the much more complex operation of the universe, which he himself portrays as very puzzling. In his argument, infinite attributes are assumed to be simpler than infinite attributes. Furthermore, the agent controlling the universe, if its operation is similar to the exhibition of regularities of succession by simpler free agents like men, must also have had a cause. He fails to explain the cause of this agent and his argument in proof of theism contradicts itself, making it unsound. The premises Swinburne raises are largely valid until the conclusion. A reader of his work will find premise one true since scientific research has empirically established the laws of nature which define the action of objects thus making premise (1) believable. It is true, taking human beings as example that regularities of succession are exhibited as the result of rational choice. A dancer will not move to the rhythm of a tune without having made the choice to dance, and this cause-effect approach makes premise (2) very coherent. If then a being is rationally controlling the universe, his powers must be very immense making premise (3) a convincing conclusion developed from the first two premises. Swinburne argues for theism by equating simpler attributes to complex attributes. In premise (3), he inductively derives a higher probability that God exists, but as with all probabilities, any outcome is likely. Simpler attributes to the actions of objects are not given an explanation to why they are true. Swinburne fails to claim that he proves the existence of God is more probable than his non-existence. He builds his argument on the causation of regularities of succession by more fundamental regularities, but fails to give an explanation for the most fundamental of these regularities: that an immensely powerful agent is rationally controlling the universe. There is thus sufficient ground to successfully object to his argument. In this paper, I evaluated an argument Richard Swinburne offered in support of theism. I first explained the distinction he creates between regularities of co-presence and regularities. I then proceeded to explain his argument and the reasons why it is valid. After this, I considered the reasons a person would choose to think that the premises he based his argument on are true and finally presented my objection to the argument by identifying and explaining why premise (3) is not necessarily valid. My conclusion was that Swinburne did not offer a sufficient reason to believe that theism is true. ? Works Cited Swinburne, Richard. â€Å"The Argument from Design†. Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology of Contemporary Views. Ed. Melville Y. Stewart. Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 1996. 233-246.